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Abstract
In the context of school zone discontinuity based on parents’ educational level, hous-
ing price, and household income, empowering parents to choose children’s schools
with their own hands has the potential to improve overall access to education by
weakening geographical advantages or disadvantages and opening up invisible
boundaries between communities. Though recent school choice proposals seem
aligned with access to education, little research has paid attention to potential access
to and actual utilization of the federal government-initiated choice program in com-
petitive markets. This paper, by representing the geographic distribution of choice
availability in a segregated metropolitan area, explores whether or not the markets
for the public school choice provision under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
are ready to serve students at chronically underperforming schools. This study finds
that the public school choice provision under the NCLB constructs unequal choice
settings between school districts. 
Keywords  Access; Availability; No Child Left Behind Act of 2001; Public school
choice; Market
Access is a major issue in education policy and is most frequently examined in re-
search on public schools. For instance, some scholars who have studied enrolment
patterns have uncovered that minority and disadvantaged students struggle with ac-
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cess to diverse and integrated school environments (Denton, 1995; Reardon, Grewal,
Kalogrides, & Greenberg, 2012; Rivkin & Welch, 2006; W.J. Wilson, 2012). Others
have indicated irreconcilable disparities in school funding and resources between
school districts, stemming from the financial structure of traditional public schools
that rely on property and income taxes from the area in which they are located
(Bodine et al., 2008; Kenn, 2001; D.E. Mitchell, Batie, & Mitchell, 2010; Reardon
& Yun, 2001). Such differences often result in widening academic achievement gaps
(Rothwell, 2012). The concerns about and evidence of inequitable access to educa-
tion provide grounds for regarding a choice scheme as an effective mechanism to
shape environments for equally accessible education. This expectation stimulates
the broad implementation and rapid expansion of school choice initiatives entangled
with market principles. Among a variety pack of choice programs across the United
States, the public school choice provision under the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001 (NCLB) may be the largest and most inclusive school choice program. Nearly
70 percent of total U.S. public schools are classified as Title I schools, and the public
school choice provision is the very first sanction imposed by NCLB on Title I schools
that fail to satisfy the Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP). Yet little work has been done
on examining what the choice markets generated by NCLB can tell us with regard
to access. This paper, by representing the geographic distribution of choice availabil-
ity in a segregated metropolitan area explores whether or not the markets for the
public school choice provision under NCLB are ready to serve students at chronically
underperforming schools.
Access and school choice
Although access is a widely used term in education, it is not a very well defined con-
cept. In order to clarify the definition of access in current studies on social justice,
equity, and equality in education markets, this study borrows the taxonomy of access
from the health care system, where both public and private interests have coexisted
as quasi-markets for longer than they have in the education sector. On the basis of
the relationship between demand and supply in markets, access is defined as “the
degree of fit between the clients and the system” (Cromley & McLafferty, 2011;
Gulliford et al., 2002; Penchansky & Thomas, 1981). Access is categorized into five
dimensions: availability, accessibility, accommodation, affordability, and acceptability.
The first two dimensions of access—availability and accessibility—are grouped into
spatial dimension of access, whereas the last three dimensions account for non-spa-
tial access (Andersen, 1995; Estabrooks, Lee, & Gyurcsik, 2003; Guagliardo, 2004).
Given that these non-spatial dimensions of access can hardly be examined if there
is a lack of schools to choose from markets, availability and accessibility are generally
regarded as the first conditions of access for the purpose of demonstrating the ade-
quacy of the supply in markets (Fortney, Rost, & Warren, 2000).
Though recent school choice proposals seem aligned with access to education,
the initial proposal of school choice was not designed to improve access to education
for all children. Rather, the original arguments for school choice paid more attention
to how to liberate students and their families and create competitive environments






tance of the relationship between parents as demand and schools as supply, the cur-
rent education systems are highly standardized and uniform (Chubb & Moe, 1990;
Walberg & Bast, 2003). Insufficient competition and limited parental right to choose
hinder the existing public schools from satisfying diverse preferences of heteroge-
neous families and from concerning themselves with the needs of marginalized, or
even sometimes of gifted, students. Therefore, proponents of school choice have sug-
gested providing opportunities to select alternative schools in an attempt to improve
a potentially poor fit between students and schools. Specifically, they have argued
that the expansion of school choice increases the correspondence between what fam-
ilies really want and what schools actually offer, since money incentives yielded by
student transfers force schools to find a market niche and innovate in order to attract
and keep students. Such a shift in emphasis from individual rights to equity for all
in school choice is predicted to usher in an era in which schools are responsive to
various needs and interests of parents and students. This process is expected to spon-
taneously help those students who are typically underserved by the public school
system to become emerging and important customers (Lubienski, 2005; Du Pont,
Goodman, & Steiger, 2001).
The more fundamental reason that access matters in school choice policies is
that school choice challenges the traditional enrolment-by-residence scheme. Widely
adopted in many countries including the U.S., the enrolment policies employed to
assign students to the closest schools do not question access—for example, whether
school admission procedures are fair or if commuting times and distances are ap-
propriate for children. Yet the boundaries of school district borders and attendance
zones, which play a decisive role in where to attend, are not neutrally drawn, but
politically gerrymandered in close association with uneven human geographies
(Denton, 1995; Lauder et al., 1999; D.E. Mitchell et al., 2010; Reardon, Yun, & Eitle,
2000; Ryan, 1999; Yinger, 1997). In distinction to the landmark hypothesis of “vot-
ing with one’s feet” (Tiebout, 1956), communities have been isolated or clustered
according to socioeconomic and ethnic attributes, such as race, income level, job,
and educational attainment (Bayer, Fang, & McMillan, 2005; Echenique & Fryer,
2007; Johnston, Poulsen, & Forrest, 2007; Massey & Denton, 1993; W.J. Wilson,
2012). An inability to afford property taxes and housing prices in one neighborhood
not only obstructs entry to a new community, but also stratifies access to public serv-
ices provided by local governments, since the quantity and quality of local public
goods depend upon residents’ taxes (Nechyba, 2010; E.K. Wilson, 2011). The seg-
mented housing patterns reproduced by structural and institutional features broaden
disparities in peer influences and social networks between and within neighbor-
hoods, as well as in access to and utilization of public services (Charles, Dinwiddie,
& Massey, 2004; Coulton & Pandey, 1992; Ellen & Turner, 1997; Galster & Killen,
1995; Lichter, Parisi, & Taquino, 2012; Mayer, 1996; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, &
Cook, 2001; Rivkin & Welch, 2006; Sampson, Morenoff, & Earls, 1999; Swanstrom,
Dreier, & Mollenkopf, 2002). Furthermore, strong local control over the school sys-
tem in the U.S. has meant that local governments have often exploited their legal
authority to maintain the status quo, for instance by shaping school zones and re-






Erickson, 2012; McDermott, 1999; Weir, 1996; E.K. Wilson, 2011). If school zone
discontinuity according to parents’ educational level, housing price, and household
income has restricted many students’ access to better-resourced and more diverse
schools (Bayer & McMillan, 2012; Black, 1999; Bodine et al., 2008; Gibbons &
Machin, 2006; Kenn, 2001; D.E. Mitchell et al., 2010; Reardon & Yun, 2001), then
empowering parents to choose children’s schools with their own hands has the po-
tential to improve overall access to education by weakening geographical advantages
or disadvantages and opening up invisible boundaries between communities. 
Local education markets for the public school choice provision
The Title I program, which provides the largest federal funding for elementary and
secondary education, was intended to support students in high-poverty districts and
schools—where more than three-fourths of total students were provided free or re-
duced-price lunches—in order to assist them in acquiring proficiency in reading
and mathematics. NCLB is devised for the same goal as the Title I program, but takes
a slightly different approach, placing more weight on accountability. Under NCLB,
the state governments measure students’ academic achievement and their progress
every year, and these results, called adequate yearly progress (AYP), are utilized as
critical evidence for whether individual schools are failing or not. Schools failing to
satisfy AYP face the five-step sanctions that embrace market principles such as choice
and competition; this stands in contrast to the past, when they simply received siz-
able financial aids. Under the first sanction, the public school choice provision under
NCLB compels a district to offer students the opportunity to choose another school,
within students’ district boundaries, that has not been identified as in need of im-
provement; this opportunity is offered to any students enrolled in repeatedly under-
performing Title I schools for two consecutive years. This student transfer policy
rests on the assumption that if students are empowered to opt out of repeatedly un-
derperforming schools, the threat of losing students encourages schools to innovate
and compete with others. Eventually, the public school choice provision under NCLB
may function as a key vehicle for offering better access to education for students
trapped in disadvantaged schools within at-risk communities. Still, little research
has paid attention to potential access to and actual utilization of the federal govern-
ment-initiated choice program in competitive markets.
Provided that two dimensions of access—availability and accessibility—are the
main preconditions for improving comprehensive access to education through choice
mechanisms, the public school choice provision, where its choice set is restricted
within the same district, brings about very few changes in spatial accessibility. Instead,
research on availability can account for access in terms of the utilization of the public
school choice provision. In view of the regulation that choice sets are restricted
within school district zones, the public school choice provision under NCLB sub-
stantially relies on the number of schools not under the improvement status within
the same school district boundaries. However, given disparities between local edu-
cation markets, we need empirical evidence to support or challenge the claim that
students eligible for the first federal sanction of the NCLB adequately shop for an-






ing schools than outperforming ones, students at chronically failing schools in the
school district, though eligible for the public school choice provision, have fewer
school options, and some of the students with few school options must remain in
the low-performing schools. In practice, school districts that have more failing
schools are less likely to have any non-failing schools (Clotfelter, 2004), and many
urban school districts have few schools not “in need of improvement” under NCLB
(Brown, 2004). Moreover, a number of secondary school districts that often operate
only a few middle and high schools within their boundaries have struggled to offer
adequate alternatives to Title I school students (Stecher et al., 2010; U.S. Department
of Education, 2009).
Of course, the government allows students to transfer to schools in neighboring
school districts under the agreement between sending and receiving school districts,
when there is no available school to choose within school districts. However, in
Illinois for instance, a receiving school district is “under no obligation to enter into
a cooperative agreement” and can decline such agreements for reasons such as its
enrolment capacity (Illinois State Board of Education, 2012). In light of the historical
court cases ruling that the federal government basically has no constitutional author-
ity in education, the public school choice provision at the federal level is nearly pow-
erless to either create markets beyond existing local education authorities or require
school districts to exchange students between them. In other words, even though
NCLB provides students at repeatedly underperforming schools with de jure chance
to leave the schools, de facto parental choice is not necessarily equitable for all be-
cause the public school choice setting is dependent on local education markets as
defined by school districts. Geographic boundaries such as school districts and
school attendance zones still act as substantial barriers to utilizing the public school
choice provision and accessing choice settings in terms of adequacy (Penchansky &
Thomas, 1981).
A case study of the Chicago metropolitan area
In order to investigate whether access to the public school choice provision under
NCLB is constrained by the lack of meaningful and attractive alternatives within the
local education market, this study examines choice availability, which is referred to
as volume and type of institutional services and resources, during the period between
the 2005–06 school year and the 2011–12 school year. The illustration of access gaps
among school districts in a metropolitan area with highly segregated housing markets
can shed light on the readiness of local education markets to serve the federal school
choice program. For this, the following research questions are addressed: 1) Does the
spatial pattern of choosable schools have any relationship with the geographic distri-
bution of housing characteristics, in terms of availability? and 2) does the choice avail-
ability present any differences from the first neighboring school districts?
This study focuses on the market for primary schools serving pre-K to eighth
graders in Cook County, Illinois. Primary school students can transfer to and access
neighboring school districts, because primary school districts cover small areas and
have many schools, in comparison with the market for secondary schools, in which






Machin, 2006; Gibbons, Machin, & Silva, 2013). One hundred seventeen school
districts in Cook County run about 1,000 schools serving students from pre-kinder-
garten through grade eight, about one-fourth of the total number of Illinois schools.
The City of Chicago School District No. 299 (CPS), the third largest urban school
district in the U.S., is located in Cook County. The AYP information for each school
between the 2005–2006 school year and the 2011–2012 school year was retrieved
from the school report cards that the Illinois State Board of Education open via the
Internet. In the 2011–2012 school year, 27.2 percent of the total primary schools in
Cook County met overall AYP, and about 600 schools were labeled as in need of im-
provement for failing to meet the state standards for more than two consecutive
years. Since the 2002–2003 school year, the first year of NCLB, one-third of the
Cook primary schools have been classified as the status of no need of improvement.
The number of repeatedly underperforming schools has increased gradually since
the 2007–2008 school year (see Figure 1). Students who enroll in Title I schools
that chronically fail to meet AYP would be eligible to enroll in one of the 40 percent
of primary schools not in need of improvement, but only if the market for the public
school choice provision under NCLB was unrestricted by school district boundaries.
This study estimates the degree of choice availability by considering the ratio of total
public schools in a district to schools not in need of improvement; using these esti-
mates, it suggests how local markets are arranged for the utilization of the public
school choice provision. In addition, this study proposes another potential choice
set consisting of the first adjacent school districts of a school district; this alternative
reveals differences in choice availability across school districts.
Figure 1. The Previous Record of the Cook County Schools
The Chicago metropolitan area within Cook County has a population of over
9.5 million and is known as a highly segregated area in the United States. Although
the recent population decline in the Chicago metropolitan area has contributed to
the positive change in segregated housing patterns since the 1980s (Iceland,
Weinberg, & Steinmetz, 2002), the city of Chicago and its surrounding areas still






Americans and immigrants are concentrated into urban areas, whereas Whites with
relatively higher family income levels reside in suburbia (Farley, Steeh, Jackson,
Krysan, & Reeves, 1993; Iceland et al., 2002; Logan, 2011). To illuminate commu-
nity characteristics discontinuously varying at school district boundaries, this study
is grounded in a large volume of research on housing patterns using demographic
and socioeconomic factors (Bayer & McMillan, 2012; Black, 1999; Bornstein &
Bradley, 2003; Darden & Kamel, 2000; Krieger et al., 2002; Krivo, Peterson, & Kuhl,
2009; Reardon, Fox, & Townsend, 2015). Given that racial preferences and urban
structures do not act alone in shaping housing patterns (Clark, 1986; Iceland &
Wilkes, 2006), twelve housing features in school districts were extracted from the
2006–2010 American Community Survey five-year estimates of the U.S. Census
Bureau:
Proportion of occupied housing units (OCCUPIED)•
Proportion of housing units occupied by owner (OWNER)•
Proportion of only White householders (ONLYWHTE)•
Proportion of only African-American householders (ONLYBLCK)•
Proportion of householders with Hispanic or Latino origin (HSPN)•
Proportion of housing units with fewer than 1.00 occupants per room •
Median number of rooms (ROOMS)•
Median built year of housing units (BUILTYR)•
Proportion of housing units with telephone service (TELEPHONE)•
Proportion of housing units with more than one vehicle available (CAR)•
Median value of owner-occupied housing units (VALUE)•
Median contract rent of renter-occupied housing units (RENT)•
Along with ordinary least squares regressions (OSL) identifying the relationship
between the availability of the public school choice options and the selected housing
features within a given school district, a mixed effects model (interchangeably called
a multi-level modeling and hierarchical linear model) is used to clarify the connection
between geographically-constrained choice availability and disparities in neighbor-
hood housing characteristics. In particular, this study looks at the change over time
by using either linear, quadratic, or cubic growth models. 
Public school choice setting in Cook County
The policy effect of the public school choice provision is determined by the avail-
ability of an adequate number of school options, i.e., how many schools have met
the state academic standards for at least two years within a school district. Based on
the fourth column of Table 1, students in two school districts would have to remain
at their schools because all schools within the school districts were identified as in
need of improvement in the 2005–2006 school year. The number of school districts
without any NCLB-sanctioned schools has markedly decreased every year, while the
number of school districts with no available school options increased by 23 school
districts in the 2010–2011 school year. The last column of Table 1 shows that most
of the school districts that offer the public school choice provision to students are






percent of the school districts that are compelled to operate student transfer policies
under NCLB physically neighbor school districts with lower ratios of chronically un-
derperforming schools. Yet since none of the Illinois school districts that are currently
entered into an intergovernmental agreement on exchanging students between dis-
tricts are located in Cook County, it is impossible for students with only a few public
school options in their district to access a wider range of public school choices.
Table 1. AYP record of Cook County primary school districts
Through the examination of choice availability between the 2005–2006 school
year and the 2010–2011 school year, the following table points out the connection
with housing features in individual school districts. Table 2 of the OLS regression
results for choice availability by school year elucidates the statistically significant re-
lationships between choice availability and the percent of occupied housing units
and the percent of only White householders. A higher proportion of only White
householders is correlated with more available school options in the school districts.
The lower vacancy rate contributes to increasing choice availability, except in the
2010–2011 school year. Though inconsistent results are detected in several school
years, the percent of housing units with telephone service improves the likelihood
that children in the school district have more school options using the public school
choice provision under NCLB. In particular, a one-unit increase in the logged median
contract rent results in a 0.5-point gain in choice availability. Yet the proportion of
housing units with fewer than 1.00 occupants per room has a negative impact on
the ratio of available schools to total schools.






















2005–2006 117 85 (72.6%) 2   (6.3%) 29 (90.6%)
2006–2007 117 86 (73.5%) 3   (9.7%) 26 (83.9%)
2007–2008 117 88 (75.2%) 3 (10.3%) 25 (86.2%)
2008–2009 117 79 (67.5%) 4 (10.5%) 34 (89.5%)
2009–2010 117 66 (56.3%) 9 (17.6%) 44 (86.3%)
2010–2011 117 54 (46.2%) 15 (23.8%) 55 (87.3%)
2011–2012 117 45 (38.5%) 23 (31.9%) 62 (86.1%)
2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011
OCCUPIED 2.700 *** 3.379 *** 2.159 *** 1.253 ** 1.386 ** -1.056 **
(0.462) (0.440) (0.520) (0.552) (0.558) (0.463)
OWNER -0.494 * -0.843 *** -0.486 1.079 *** -0.168 -0.503 **
(0.268) (0.273) (0.341) (0.290) (0.293) (0.230)
Table 2. (continued)
Table 3 demonstrates the significance of annual changes in choice availability
by school district. Reflecting the non-linear patterns of choice availability by school
year in individual school districts, the trend of choice availability using the growth
curve model has the greatest goodness of fit for the cubic model (logLik=888.525,
p<0.0001). Model I for choice availability indicates that the choice availability in a
given school district starts at 0.787 with the gain in the second year at 0.194, but
the annual choice availability decreases in the third year. Then the choice availability
ratios slightly increase again per year, when unconditioned by the selected housing
features in 117 school districts. Model 2 for choice availability suggests a statistically
significant and positive impact of householders’ race on choice availability. A one-
percent increase in the proportion of White and African-American householders in







2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011
ONLYWHTE 1.411 *** 3.280 *** 2.228 *** 2.201 *** 2.564 *** 1.379 ***
(0.482) (0.506) (0.605) (0.401) (0.386) (0.294)
ONLYBLCK 0.600 2.772 *** 1.969 *** 1.206 *** 1.952 *** 0.317
(0.520) (0.544) (0.650) (0.408) (0.392) (0.306)
HSPN -0.260 1.068 *** 1.048 ** -0.719 *** -0.281 -1.219 ***
(0.368) (0.401) (0.500) (0.266) (0.270) (0.216)
LESS-
CROWDED
-4.294 *** -4.097 *** -0.646 -6.446 *** -6.869 *** -4.202 ***
(1.251) (1.209) (1.432) (1.332) (1.370) (1.085)
ROOMS 0.114 * -0.065 0.069 -0.037 0.006 0.313 ***
(0.065) (0.068) (0.085) (0.072) (0.068) (0.060)
BUILTYR 0.009 *** -0.003 0.000 -0.014 *** -0.003 -0.007
***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
TELEPHONE -2.388 *** 2.868 *** 3.676 *** 0.526 2.246 ** 1.906 **
(0.818) (0.823) (1.022) (0.985) (0.978) (0.748)
CAR 0.126 0.736 * -0.197 -0.012 -0.212 0.268
(0.427) (0.374) (0.494) (0.453) (0.462) (0.374)
VALUE (logged) -0.075 -0.452 *** -0.349 *** -0.567 *** 0.055 0.020
(0.099) (0.104) (0.126) (0.111) (0.071) (0.059)
RENT (logged) -0.054 0.877 *** 0.600 *** 1.176 *** 0.784 *** 0.241




** 2.594 -6.063 29.332 *** 1.198 12.362 ***
Adjusted R2 0.443 0.497 0.358 0.466 0.370 0.546
*** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.10
Table 3. Growth curve analysis of choice availability
In addition to the finding that choice availability changes in accordance with the
cubic year term by school district, the gap in choice availability between a given
school district and its first closest districts provides the weak but still significant
structural difference in the variances by school year and school district. Since differ-
ences in choice availability from adjacent school districts are less likely to be con-
founded with the change of school year, time change explains only a small part of
the difference in choice availabilities between the school districts. Instead, more
housing features with statistical significances account for the lack of public school
options under NCLB. If a certain school district expresses larger differences in the
proportion of owner-occupied housing units, the proportion of only White house-
holders, and the proportion of housing units with telephone service compared to
its neighboring school districts, the school district is likely to have fewer schools
which are under NCLB sanctions. Moreover, the difference in median contract rent
decreases the ratio of choice availability by 0.2 points per $1,000. The dispropor-
tionate distribution of householders of Hispanic or Latino origin in Cook County
also contributes the probability that students in the school districts with a large im-
migrant population will lack access to better performing schools through NCLB.






Choice availability Difference in choice availability
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Year 0.194 (0.018) *** 0.189 (0.018) *** -0.070 (0.035) ** -0.069 (0.029) **
Quadratic year -0.076 (0.006) *** -0.077 (0.006) *** 0.025 (0.013) * 0.026 (0.011) **
Cubic year 0.006 (0.001) *** 0.006 (0.001) *** -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) *
OCCUPIED 0.727 (1.045) -0.385 (0.210) *
OWNER -0.291 (0.499) 0.306 (0.115) ***
ONLYWHTE 1.947 (0.627) *** 0.476 (0.164) ***
ONLYBLCK 1.204 (0.644) * -0.129 (0.171)
HSPN -0.355 (0.468) -0.842 (0.128) ***
LESSCROWDED -3.137 (2.455) 0.007 (0.479)
ROOMS 0.203 (0.114) * 0.008 (0.028)
BUILTYR -0.002 (0.004) -0.003 (0.001) **
TELEPHONE 2.749 (1.677) 1.139 (0.390) ***
CAR -1.699 (1.071) 0.222 (0.193)
VALUE 0.169 (0.126) 0.000 (0.000) *
RENT 0.291 (0.326) 0.000 (0.000) ***
Intercept 0.787 (0.072) *** 0.635 (9.097) 0.005 (0.054) -0.047 (0.054)
*** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.10
school choice provision under NCLB, essentially confining its choice markets to ge-
ographical district boundaries, intensifies disparities between school districts. Given
the relationship between school district boundaries and residential patterns, simply
offering a chance to transfer to another school within the student’s own school district
may only strengthen the polarization of educational opportunities between local ed-
ucation markets.
Discussion
The public school choice provision of the NCLB does not directly improve the failing
schools, because the policy moves students away from low performing schools and
threatens those schools financially (Hess & Finn, 2004). However, student transfers
from low performing schools to high performing ones may function as a critical driv-
ing force for encouraging academically unacceptable schools to innovate and reform
themselves. Assuming that market incentives through competition not only improve
academic achievement but also realize equal educational opportunities, the public
school choice provision allows students in troubled schools to have access to aca-
demically successful schools free of charge. Here, the measure of access to quality
markets is essential to understanding the actual effects of market forces such as com-
petition and choice. While a considerable number of studies have been conducted
to investigate the impacts of school choice programs on equitable distribution of ed-
ucational opportunities, the concern about market readiness for choice has been un-
derstudied. Simply granting choice can hardly promote dramatic changes in
education without the support of additional mechanisms which generate quality al-
ternatives (Lubienski, 2005); thus, a lack of available school options within permitted
school district boundaries could discourage families eligible for school choice under
the federal and state initiatives. Furthermore, a deficiency of comparable competitors
within the markets might offer insufficient incentive for service providers, specifically
repeatedly low-performing public schools in this study, to generate substantial in-
novation and diversity in current public school systems. Research on choice avail-
ability under the public school choice provision of NCLB, which offers students
alternatives to repeatedly underperforming schools but restricts these choices to their
school districts, can help identify the degree to which local education markets in
highly segregated metropolitan areas are ready to serve the purpose of providing
equal educational opportunities.
Through focusing on Cook County, Illinois, this study finds that the public
school choice provision under the NCLB builds unequal choice settings between
school districts. Given that all the school districts in Cook County have different ex-
tents of choice availability, the householders’ race in school districts accounts for the
probability that students will transfer to better learning environments. The growth
curve models presented minor, and therefore negligible, effects of time change on
choice availability, similar to the recent study which found that persistently under-
performing schools do not experience significant turnarounds for the notable impact
of student characteristics on achievement (Stuit, 2012). This study also indicates
that school districts with lower choice availability are physically adjacent to ones






trict and its neighboring ones are largely explained by the housing features in the
school districts. Therefore, students who are eligible for the public school choice
provision but whose school districts have fewer available school options are unlikely
to escape from repeatedly low-performing schools. Even though there are several
better-performing schools in geographically neighboring school districts, students
in certain areas tend to be placed in a catch-22 situation, i.e., the lower choice avail-
ability and the more underprivileged learning environments attributed to residential
segregation. The connection between the gap in choice availability and the discrep-
ancy in housing characteristics by school district indicates that the utilization of pub-
lic school choice is determined by where students live and which school district they
belong to, regardless of their eligibility.
A large volume of studies have provided sufficient evidence that school district
boundaries are consistent with the distribution of living zones clustered by race and
ethnicity, income level, and other attributes, not by the preference of different revenue
and expenditure patterns in local settings (Bayer & McMillan, 2012; Lipman, 2002;
Vergari, 2002). These boundaries have legal power to exclude surrounding communi-
ties with either disadvantaged or advantaged members by limiting enrolment across
districts, as in the Court’s decision on San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
(1973) and Milliken v. Bradley (1974) that justified local control over schools. Given
that the ability to pay for housing prices and property taxes hinders parents from shop-
ping for schools and entering into new communities that satisfy their needs and pref-
erences (Billings, Brunner, & Ross, 2014; E.K. Wilson, 2011), this study finds that the
effective use of the public school choice provision is mostly trapped within the bound-
aries of a school district, and either explicitly or implicitly involves a question of af-
fordability for moving into a new community. Since the public school choice provision,
which is strongly controlled by local contexts, has a potential to polarize the exercise
of choice availability among uneven school districts, the rising issue surrounding choice
is not to whom the choice is offered, but rather under what conditions choice is prac-
tically exercised. As noted earlier, the public school choice provision fundamentally
compels school districts to offer choice only within their zone boundaries, and school
districts prefer keeping their boundaries closed and tend to eschew co-operative trans-
fer agreements. The local educational market hierarchies thus offer differentiated quality
and quantity of public school choice to students (Lubienski, 2005), such that students
who enroll in chronically low-performing schools in predominantly segregated school
districts can encounter double isolation. Consequently, this study suggests that the
public school choice provision under NCLB relies on a market mechanism with only
limited effectiveness in providing meaningful school options to students in fragmented
communities, in that it often fails to allow parents the opportunity to emancipate their
children from homogeneous learning environments.
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